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HOUSING IN MONTANA: NOT FOR ADULTS
ONLY
Jeffrey T. Even
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years a nationwide controversy has emerged over dis-
crimination in housing against tenants with children.1 Many land-
lords have long refused to rent to people with children.2 This prac-
tice has increasingly been challenged in both state and federal
courts as unlawful discrimination. The Montana Human Rights
Commission recently addressed this issue in terms of Montana law
when it interpreted the housing section of the Montana Human
Rights Act.' This question, controversial nationwide, will undoubt-
edly remain alive in Montana through at least the 1987 legislative
session.
This comment analyzes the federal and state law regarding the
denial of housing to people with children. It then discusses the
procedure involved in bringing a fair housing case and includes a
discussion of the available remedies. Finally, this comment closes
with a recommendation to the 1987 Montana Legislature.
II. MONTANA LAW
The Montana Human Rights Act contains a section prohibit-
ing housing discrimination based on age." This act provides the ba-
sis of the claim that refusal to rent to tenants with children vio-
lates Montana law. The validity of this claim has not yet been
1. The relevance of some of the material in this comment is more broad than age
discrimination in housing. The section on procedure, in particular, is applicable to any case
based on the Montana Human Rights Act, MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 49, ch. 2 (1985).
2. The refusal of landlords to rent to tenants with children has been a significant
problem in Montana. Testimony before the Montana Human Rights Commission indicated
that in Bozeman, for example, 75 percent of the apartments that rent to university students
do not allow children. Anecdotal testimony pointed out similar problems in Missoula and
Butte. Ruling on Housing Discrimination is Pending, The Missoulian, May 11, 1985, at 15,
col. 1. See also, Bozeman Mother Protests 'For Rent, No Kids' Practice, The Missoulian,
November 26, 1985, at 18, col. 1.
3. MONT. CODE ANN. tit. 49, ch. 2 (1985). This comment chiefly concerns the housing
provision, MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-305 (1985). The provision reads in pertinent part:
Discrimination in housing. (1) Except when the distinction is based on reasonable
grounds, it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for the owner, lessee, manager,
or other person having the right to sell, lease, or rent a housing accommodation or
improved or unimproved property:
(a) to refuse to sell, lease, or rent the housing accommodation or property to a
person because of ... age ...
4. Id.
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tested before any court in Montana. Similar claims have been con-
sidered by courts of other states, however, and by the Montana
Human Rights Commission.
In September 1985 the Commission adopted an administrative
rule interpreting the age provision of the statute. The rule prohib-
its discrimination based on the presence of children in the house-
hold.5 Subsection (1) of the rule provides:
24.9.1107 REAL PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS; AGE DIS-
CRIMINATION. (1) Section 49-2-305 (1), MCA, which prohibits
discrimination in housing on the basis of age, shall cover refusal
to sell, rent or lease a housing accommodation or improved or un-
improved property because of the age of a person residing with
the buyer, lessee, or renter.6
Subsection (2) of the rule exempts federal housing from the provi-
sions of subsection (1). 7 Subsection (3) provides an exception for
senior citizen housing.8
The issue of housing discrimination based on the presence of
children involves the balancing of conflicting interests. The inter-
est of the landlord in controlling the use of private property must
be weighed against the need of families and single parents to find
suitable housing. Opponents of the rule argued to the Human
Rights Commission that landlords should be allowed to prohibit
children, "because children are noisier and cause more damage
than other tenants."9 Further, denial of a landlord's right to ex-
clude children may constitute both overregulation and interference
with private property rights. This would discourage investment in
rental property.10
The Human Rights Commission rejected these arguments,
finding the rule, "consistent with the language and intent of the
statute."" The Commission also found the argument that children
are noisier and more destructive than other tenants to be simply a
"stereotypical assumption."' 2 The Commission noted that the Act
prohibits discrimination based on similar assumptions regarding
5. The rule is not yet included in the Administrative Rules of Montana, but will be
included at MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.9.1107. Also found at MONT. ADMIN. REG. 1399 (1985).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. A petition for declaratory ruling that senior citizen housing does not violate
MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-305 (1985) is currently pending before the Human Rights Commis-
sion. MONT. ADMIN. REG. 1205 (1985).
9. Id. at 1399.
10. Id. at 1399-1400.
11. Id. at 1400.
12. Id.
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race, sex, or handicap.1 3 The Commission's holding implicitly al-
lows discrimination based only on specific characteristics of indi-
viduals, rather than on loosely reasoned assumptions about entire
classes. "
The Commission's rule will not become effective until July 1,
1987.1' Postponing the effective date allows the legislature to ex-
amine the issue of adults-only housing before a prohibition takes
effect. It also ensures, however, that age-based housing discrimina-
tion will remain a controversial issue in Montana.
III. DEVELOPMENTS IN OTHER STATES
An analysis of recent developments in several other states il-
luminates the issue facing Montana. The courts of many other
states, particularly California, have explored the issue of adults-
only housing. These decisions provide a significant body of law re-
garding both lease provisions in rental housing and restrictive cov-
enants in fee simple housing.
With a few exceptions,'6 the courts of most states have until
recently allowed such discrimination. In 1946, the Ohio Supreme
Court found that a landlord may contract for a lease provision bar-
ring children and discerned no statutory or constitutional limita-
tion on this right.17 Similarly, a 1967 Georgia Supreme Court opin-
ion upheld the eviction of a woman who had given birth to an
illegitimate child.'" This comment will examine the trend in both
federal and state courts, and demonstrate that courts have recog-
nized the right of tenants with children to have access to the hous-
ing market. California has led the way.
A. Arbitrary vs. Reasonable Discrimination: The California
Cases
1. Background
Attempts by California claimants to invalidate age-based dis-
13. Id.
14. For a fuller explanation of this argument, see Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30
Cal. 3d 721, 738, 640 P.2d 115, 125, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496, 507 (1982).
15. This will be included at MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.9.1107(4). Also found at MoNT. ADMIN.
REG. 1399 (1985).
16. In 1946, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected a landlord's argument that renting to
people with children "just wouldn't work out." People v. Metcoff, 392 Ill. 418, 64 N.E.2d 867
(1946). In Gilman v. City of Newark, 73 N.J. Super. 562, 180 A.2d 365 (1962), the court
invalidated sections of a city ordinance prohibiting minors from living in rooming houses as
conflicting with state law.
17. Lamont Bldg. Co. v. Court, 147 Ohio St. 183, 70 N.E.2d 447 (1946).
18. Williams v. Housing Authority of Atlanta, 223 Ga. 407, 155 S.E.2d 923 (1967).
19861
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crimination rely on that state's Unruh Civil Rights Act. 9 This act
differs significantly from Montana's Human Rights Act in that the
California act does not specifically prohibit discrimination based
on age.20
The California Supreme Court has ruled, however, that pro-
tection under the Unruh Act embraces more than the enumerated
categories. The court, in In Re Cox, 2 1 found the categories listed in
the statute to be illustrative rather than restrictive. The court
ruled that the act prohibited all arbitrary discrimination.22 The
question, therefore, is whether refusal to allow occupancy by chil-
dren is arbitrary.
The California courts until recently held such discrimination
to be reasonable. For example, in Flowers v. John Burnham and
Co, 23 the landlord prohibited families with male children over age
five. The court found that "regulating tenants' ages and sex to that
extent is not unreasonable or arbitrary. "24
2. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson
The 1982 landmark decision of the California Supreme Court
in Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson 25 altered the earlier application
of the Unruh Act. This case presents an excellent study in the is-
sues involved in a challenge of housing restrictions which discrimi-
nate against tenants with children.
In Marina Point, the landlord, plaintiff Marina Point, Ltd,
sought to evict defendants Stephen and Lois Wolfson. The Wolf-
sons moved into Marina Point in January, 1974 and signed a lease
which prohibited children.26 The couple's first child was born the
19. CAL. Civ. CODE § 51 (West 1982). The full text of the act is as follows:
§ 51. Unruh Civil Rights Act; equal rights; business establishments
This section shall be known, and may be cited, as the Unruh Civil Rights Act.
All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no
matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin are entitled
to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services
in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever.
This section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a per-
son which is conditioned or limited by law or which is applicable alike to persons
of every sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, or national origin.
20. Id.
21. 3 Cal. 3d 205, 216, 474 P.2d 992, 999, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24, 31 (1970).
22. Id.
23. 21 Cal. App. 3d 700, 98 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1971).
24. Id. at 703, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 645. A few years later, the California Court of Appeals
held valid a by-law of a condominium association refusing residence to minors. Ritchey v.
Villa Nueva Condominium Assoc., 81 Cal. App. 3d 688, 146 Cal. Rptr. 695 (1978).
25. 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1982).
26. Id. at 726, 640 P.2d at 117, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
[Vol. 47
4
Montana Law Review, Vol. 47 [1986], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol47/iss1/8
HOUSING IN MONTANA
following September.17 Marina Point refused to renew the lease be-
cause of the child.28 When the Wolfsons did not leave the apart-
ment complex, Marina Point brought an unlawful detainer action
against them.2'9 The Wolfsons contended that Marina Point's
adults-only policy violated California law.30
The California Supreme Court held for the Wolfsons, relying
upon its previous decision in In Re Cox." The court concluded, as
it had in Cox, that the Unruh Act prohibits all arbitrary
discrimination. 2
The court's decision turned on whether the discrimination was
arbitrary or reasonable. Marina Point argued that the exclusion of
children was entirely reasonable, referring to "past instances in
which young tenants had engaged in annoying or potentially dan-
gerous activities, ranging from acts of arson to roller skating and
batting practice in the hallways to the attempted solicitation of
snacks from the landlord's office staff."33 In addition, two expert
witnesses from the real estate business testified on behalf of Ma-
rina Point that children frequently cause more wear and tear on
property than adults. They further testifed that because of this,
landlords who rent to families with children experience higher
maintenance costs than landlords who exclude children.3 4
The landlord, however, made no allegations specifically re-
garding the Wolfsons' child.3 5 Two of the Wolfsons' neighbors tes-
tified that the child did not disturb them.3 Expert testimony on
behalf of the Wolfsons contradicted plaintiff's contention that
landlords who rented to families with children faced higher main-
tenance costs.3 7 The Wolfsons also introduced studies showing the
extent to which exclusionary policies limited the availability of
housing to people with children. The Supreme Court agreed and
noted that "in many of the major metropolitan areas of the state,
families with children are excluded from 60 to 80 percent of the
available rental housing.'"38
27. Id. at 727, 640 P.2d at 118, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 727, 640 P.2d at 118, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
30. Id.
31. 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970).
32. Marina Point, Ltd., 30 Cal. 3d at 732, 640 P.2d at 122, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
33. Id. at 728, 640 P.2d at 118, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
34. Id. at 728, 640 P.2d at 119, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
35. Id. at 728, 640 P.2d at 118, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
36. Id. at 728, 640 P.2d at 119, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 728-729, 640 P.2d at 119, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 501. This has caused at least one
writer to fear "child ghettos" in which families dependent on the rental market would be
1986]
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The court found the blanket exclusion of all children to be
illegal, arbitrary discrimination. a An entire class of people may not
be excluded simply on the basis of statistical inference; rather, the
landlord must base the exclusion on the characteristics of the par-
ticular individual.4 0
B. Restriction to Designated Buildings
The Michigan Supreme Court, in Department of Civil Rights
v. Beznos Corp.,4 1 addressed a slightly different issue than that
raised in the California cases. In Beznos, the landlord allowed chil-
dren in certain buildings in its complex and excluded them from
others.42
The court held that the restriction of families with children to
certain buildings did not violate the Michigan Civil Rights Act 4-
but refrained from holding "that such designation could never be
violative of the act. '4 4 The court held only that the restriction of
children to certain buildings is permissible only when the landlord
acted "in the interest of the comfort and safety of all of the
tenants."
4 5
The Beznos decision was accompanied by a vigorous dissent
which argued that the majority opinion decided nothing. The dis-
senting justice pointed out that the majority provided no real
guidelines for determining when a landlord may or may not restrict
children to certain buildings."
relegated to the worst neighborhoods with inferior educational opportunities. Note, Housing
Discrimination Against Families With Children: A National Concern, 20 WASHBURN L.J.
307, 310 (1980).
39. Marina Point, Ltd., 30 Cal. 3d at 739, 640 P.2d at 124, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
40. The court explained:
As we recognized in Cox, of course, an individual may forfeit his statutory right of
access to the services of a business enterprise if he conducts himself improperly or
disrupts the operations of the enterprise. But, contrary to the contention of Ma-
rina Point and the suggestion of the Flowers case, the Unruh Act does not permit
a business enterprise to exclude an entire class of individuals on the basis of a
generalized prediction that the class "as a whole" is more likely to commit miscon-
duct than some other class of the public.
Marina Point, Ltd., 30 Cal. 3d at 738, 640 P.2d at 125, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 507 (emphasis in
original).
41. 421 Mich. 110, 365 N.W.2d 82 (1984).
42. Id. at - , 365 N.W.2d at 85.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. The court distinguished age from all other prohibited categories. The court
claimed, astonishingly, that to do otherwise would "require landlords to rent apartments to
minor children." Id. at -, 365 N.W.2d at 87.
46. Id. at - , 365 N.W.2d at 88-89 (Ryan, J. dissenting).
[Vol. 47
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C. Restrictive Covenants
This comment has focused to this point on the validity of
leases prohibiting occupancy by children. Children may also be ex-
cluded from housing through a restrictive covenant in a deed.47
Cases dealing with the validity of covenants that prohibit children
frequently involve condominium developments. Because covenants
may appear in deeds to any real property, the following discussion
of age-restrictive covenants can be applied beyond the condomin-
ium context.
In 1974, an Arizona court ruled that an age-restrictive cove-
nant remained in force even though the state had enacted a law
which expressly banned discrimination against tenants with chil-
dren.'" That court found that the covenant bore a "rational rela-
tionship to a permissible state objective."' 49
The Florida Supreme Court has arrived at substantially the
same conclusion. In White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin,50
a child-restrictive covenant survived a challenge.5 1 The court found
age restrictions to be a "reasonable means to accomplish the lawful
purpose of providing appropriate facilities for the differing housing
needs and desires of the varying age groups. '5 2 Florida courts have
maintained this interpretation.53
Until recently this was the rule in California as well. In 1978,
the California Court of Appeals held valid a condominium develop-
ment restriction against families with children. 4
In 1983, the California Supreme Court considered age-restric-
tive covenants in light of the Marina Point decision regarding
rental restrictions. In O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Associa-
tion,5 the court invalidated an age-restrictive covenant in a condo-
minium development. The court concluded that just as the Unruh
Civil Rights Act5" prohibits lease provisions banning children, it
47. Montana statutes governing servitudes and covenants are contained in MONT.
CODE ANN., tit. 70, ch. 17 (1985).
48. Riley v. Stoves, 22 Ariz. App. 223, 228, 526 P.2d 747, 751 (1974).
49. Id.
50. 379 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1979).
51. Id. at 352.
52. Id. at 351.
53. In Star Lake N. Commodore Ass'n v. Parker, 423 So.2d 509, 511 (Fla. 1982), the
court explained that White Egret only invalidated age restrictions where applied selectively
or arbitrarily. See also, Everglades Plaza Condominium Ass'n v. Buckner, 462 So.2d 835
(Fla. 1984).
54. Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condominium Ass'n, 81 Cal. App. 3d 688, 146 Cal. Rptr.
695 (1978).
55. 33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983).
56. CAL. CIv. CODE § 51 (West 1982).
1986]
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also bans provisions contained in restrictive covenants.5 7
The O'Connor holding, later endorsed by the California Legis-
lature, 8 makes eminent good sense for any jurisdiction that has
banned age-restrictive lease provisions. It makes no sense to pre-
vent a property owner from prohibiting occupancy by children
through a lease provision, while allowing them to attain the same
goal through a real covenant. Such a distinction would allow age
restrictions even in rental property. A landlord could simply con-
vey the rental property to a straw and take it back again by a deed
containing an age-restrictive covenant. This would make a mockery
of any fair housing act.
IV. FEDERAL ACTIONS
Challenges to housing discrimination against children have
also been brought in federal court. In Halet v. Wend Investment
Co. 69 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue under
the fourteenth amendment, 0 the federal Civil Rights Act,6 and
the federal Fair Housing Act.62
A. The Fourteenth Amendment and the Federal Civil Rights
Act
A claim based on either the federal Civil Rights Act or the
fourteenth amendment must prove "state action" to prevail . 3 Gen-
erally, state action is difficult to demonstrate in a case of housing
discrimination. In most cases, the discrimination results solely
from the actions of the landlord.
The intricacies of the state action doctrine are too complex to
explore here. 4 State action notwithstanding, an exclusion from
housing based on the presence of a child in the family probably
violates the fourteenth amendment and the federal Civil Rights
57. O'Connor, 33 Cal. 3d at 792, 662 P.2d at 428, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
58. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.2 (West Supp. 1984).
59. 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982, and 1983 (1982).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1982).
63. Halet, 672 F.2d at 1309. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S.
1 (1948) stated, "[tihe principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that
the action inhibited by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such actions
as may fairly be said to be that of the States." Id. at 13.
64. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Halet, 672 F.2d at 1309-10; Note, Fa-
milial Discrimination in Rental Housing: The Halet Decision, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1085,
1097-98 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, Familial Discrimination]; Note, The Enforceabil-
ity of Age Restrictive Covenants in Condominium Developments, 54 S. CAL. L. REv. 1397,
1409-19 (1981).
[Vol. 47
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Act. The Halet court found that "[flamily life, in particular the
right of family members to live together, is part of the fundamen-
tal right of privacy." 5
B. The Federal Fair Housing Act
A plaintiff may also have a claim of age discrimination based
on the federal Fair Housing Act.6 6 Unlike the Montana act, the
federal act does not list age as a prohibited motive for discrimina-
tion.6 7 Because of this, tenants have to be creative in bringing the
exclusion of children within the prohibitions of the act. One possi-
bility is to argue that the prohibition of children constitutes dis-
crimination based on race.6 This is based on a statistical showing
that minorities tend to have more children. A similar claim could
be made alleging sex discrimination, based on the disproportionate
numbers of single parent families headed by women.
A plaintiff need not belong to the minority against which dis-
crimination was allegedly directed to have standing to sue under
the federal Fair Housing Act.69 Nor is it necessary to show discrim-
inatory intent.7 0 For a claim to succeed, a court need only find dis-
criminatory effect,7 ' but this is unlikely in adults-only housing
cases. The discrimination in an adults-only housing case is based
on the presence of children. While this may impact more severely
on racial minorities or women, it is difficult to call this racial or
sexual discrimination. The discrimination is based on something
other than race or sex. The federal Fair Housing Act, for this rea-
son, is not likely to provide relief for the tenant with children.
C. Additional Federal Remedy
Federal law provides an additional, although strictly limited,
remedy for age discrimination. If the landlord has received federal
mortgage insurance for rental housing, he may not discriminate
against families with children.72
65. Halet, 672 F.2d at 1311.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1982).
67. The federal Fair Housing Act prohibits housing discrimination based on "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. §3604 (1982).
68. See Note, Familial Discrimination, supra note 64, at 1101 (1984).
69. Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1979), granting
standing for a white person to challenge discrimination against blacks.
70. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184-85.
71. Id.
72. 12 U.S.C. § 1713(b) (1982).
1986]
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D. Attorney Fees
A successful party under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act
is entitled, at the discretion of the court, to attorney fees.73 Attor-
ney fees are also allowed under the federal Fair Housing Act, but
only for the plaintiff, and only if the plaintiff cannot pay his own
fees.74
V. MONTANA PRACTICE
A challenge to age discrimination in Montana would be best
pursued through state remedies. Because Montana law does not
contain a state action requirement and does list age as an enumer-
ated category, the most difficult aspects of a federal case can be
averted. The new rule adopted by the Montana Human Rights
Commission, once in effect, will provide a strong basis for striking
down adults-only housing policies. The rule has yet to withstand
judicial scrutiny.
A. Validity of the New Rule
To be valid, administrative rules must meet the requirements
of Montana law.75 As discussed earlier, the Montana Human
Rights Commission has adopted an administrative rule interpret-
ing the housing provision of the Montana Human Rights Act as
prohibiting adults-only housing policies. While there is room for
debate, this rule probably meets the requirements for validity.
Montana law establishes two requirements for the validity of
an administrative rule.76 The Montana Supreme Court has held
that "administrative regulations are 'out of harmony' with legisla-
tive guidelines if they: (1) 'engraft additional and contradictory re-
quirements on the statute'; or (2) if they engraft additional, non-
contradictory requirements on the statute which were not
envisioned by the legislature. '77
The new rule banning adults-only housing does not conflict
with any express provision of the Montana Human Rights Act and
73. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). This section is discretionary. In the Ninth Circuit, at
least, fees may be denied to the plaintiff if there is a contingency fee agreement. See, e.g.,
Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1979).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1982). This means that a poor tenant can bring a case without
risk of being held liable for the landlord's legal fees.
75. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-305(6) (1985).
76. Id.
77. Bell v. Dep't of Licensing, 182 Mont. 21, 23, 594 P.2d 331, 333 (1979). While this
wording differs from that in the statute, the court has held that the two tests are identical.
Board of Barbers v. Big Sky College, - Mont. -, -, 626 P.2d 1269, 1271 (1981).
[Vol. 47
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so meets the first requirement. It could be argued, however, that
by prohibiting adults-only housing policies the rule adds an addi-
tional requirement to the law, thus violating the second part of the
test. On closer inspection, however, the rule does not add any new
requirement to those already present in the statute, but merely in-
terprets an ambiguous term. The Montana Supreme Court has in-
validated an administrative rule only in cases in which the rule
added a requirement that was clearly additional to anything found
in the statute.78 The rule adopted by the Human Rights Commis-
sion, however, merely explains the meaning of the word age in the
statute.
The interpretation itself is reasonable. The Commission's rule
is consistent with the statutory definition of age. Montana statute
defines age as the "number of years since birth. It does not mean
level of maturity or ability to handle responsibility. These latter
criteria may represent legitimate considerations as reasonable
grounds for discrimination without reference to age."'79 Clearly the
legislature intended that characteristics of individuals be relevant
only on an individual basis. The legislature did not intend to allow
discrimination based on statistical inferences that people of a cer-
tain age may be more noisy or destructive than other classes of
people. The new administrative rule effects the legislature's intent.
B. Investigation
A fair housing case must be properly investigated. The more
aware the landlord may be of the requirements of fair housing law
the more creative thought this investigation will require. Collecting
evidence may be extremely easy in Montana at present. Landlords
frequently advertise that the residence is open only to adults. This
advertising itself violates Montana law." Of course, if the landlord
is aware of the illegality of age restrictions, any discrimination will
78. The court has invalidated a rule requiring that instructors at a barber college must
first pass an examination. Since the statute did not mention an examination, the require-
ment was clearly in addition to anything in the statute. Bell v. Dep't of Licensing, 182
Mont. 21, 23, 594 P.2d 331, 333 (1979). Similarly the court struck down a rule requiring that
barbers serve their apprenticeship in a commercial barbershop, while the statute had re-
quired only the supervision of a licensed barber. Board of Barbers v. Big Sky College, -
Mont. ., -, 626 P.2d 1269, 1271 (1981). The court has also invalidated a rule adding a
requirement to those in the statute regarding the licensing of a psychologist. McPhail v.
Montana Bd. of Psychologists, - Mont. -, -, 640 P.2d 906, 908 (1983).
79. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101 (1985).
80. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-305(3) (1985). It is also worth noting that MONT. CODE
ANN. § 49-2-305(1)(c) makes it illegal "to make written or oral inquiry or record of" the fact
that a person seeking housing falls into one of the categories against which discrimination is
prohibited.
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probably be hidden.
The use of a "tester" presents one accepted 81 method of inves-
tigation in a fair housing case.82 A tester is an investigator who
poses as an apartment seeker and attempts to isolate the land-
lord's true motives in rejecting the plaintiff. If a client suspects
discrimination, the attorney may send an investigator to attempt
to rent the apartment. The investigator should not be a member of
whatever suspect class to which the client may belong. If the inves-
tigator is offered the housing while the client was not, it may indi-
cate the landlord's true motives. This is one way of proving that
discrimination has taken place.
Investigation should also be aimed at discovering how many
members of the suspect category, if any, are currently renting from
the target landlord. If there are few or no members of that class, it
will help establish a case of discrimination.8 3
C. Mootness
In Halet v. Wend Investment Co.,84 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of mootness in a fair housing claim.
Between the filing of the complaint and the trial, the landlord,
Wend, voluntarily ceased its adults-only policy. Wend maintained
that its action rendered Halet's claim moot.8 5 The court rejected
this argument, ruling that the court "cannot rely on Wend's state-
ment alone. Wend could revert to an adults-only policy in the fu-
ture, and Wend has not demonstrated that there is no reasonable
expectation of such an occurrence." ' 6 A fair housing case does not
become moot merely because the landlord voluntarily changes
policy.
D. Procedure
1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The pursuit of a fair housing claim begins with the filing of a
81. See, e.g., United States v. Yuritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643 (N.D. Cal. 1973),
affirmed as modified, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975). See also, United States v. Wisconsin, 395
F. Supp. 732 (W.D. Wis. 1975) (invalidating a state law that banned testing).
82. Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities, Guide To Practice Open
Housing Law, 5, (1980). This is an invaluable work for any attorney practicing open housing
law. While this comment only sketches the practical issues involved in a fair housing case,
this guide provides a more detailed study. Leadership Council For Metropolitan Open Com-
munities, 407 S. Dearborn St., Chicago, IL 60605.
83. See, e.g., Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1979).
84. 672 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1982).
85. Id. at 1307.
86. Id. at 1308.
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complaint with the Montana Human Rights Commission.8 7 A
plaintiff must exhaust this administrative remedy before action
can be taken in district court.8 8 The statute governing the filing of
a complaint before the Commission is phrased permissively.8 9 Sec-
tion two of that statute, however, states, "A complaint under this
chapter must be filed with the commission within 180 days . "90o
In addition, another statute outlines the procedure for filing a
complaint in district court.91 A prerequisite is receiving the permis-
sion of the Human Rights Commission. This permission is only
granted in cases where the Commission has failed to deal with the
case." It therefore appears that a case must begin before the
Human Rights Commission. A federal district court, applying
Montana law, has reached the same conclusion.s
2. Complaint and Temporary Relief
The Commission may file a complaint in district court seeking
temporary relief against the landlord's discriminatory practices.
9 4
This is important, because the ultimate objective of the plaintiff is
to secure the housing. This objective will be defeated if the land-
lord can rent the property to someone else before the case is set-
tled. The plaintiff should be allowed to seek this relief directly,
without having to wait for the Commission to act. It should also be
noted that the statute limits temporary relief to 14 days, "except
by consent of the respondent or upon a finding by the court that
there is reasonable cause to believe that the respondent has en-
87. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-501 (1985). This statute reads:
Filing complaints. (1) A complaint may be filed by or on the behalf of any person
claiming to be aggrieved by any discriminatory practice prohibited by this chap-
ter. The complaint must be in the form of a written, verified complaint stating the
name and address of the person, educational institution, financial institution, or
governmental entity or agency alleged to have engaged in the discriminatory prac-
tice and the particulars of the alleged discriminatory practice. The commission
staff may file a complaint in like manner when a discriminatory practice comes to
its attention.
(2) A complaint under this chapter must be filed with the commission within
180 days after the alleged unlawful discriminatory practice occurred or was discov-
ered. Any complaint not filed within the time set forth herein may not be consid-
ered by the commission.
88. Walker v. Anaconda Co., 520 F. Supp. 1143 (D. Mont. 1981).
89. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-501 (1985).
90. Id.
91. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-509 (1985).
92. Id.
93. In Walker, 520 F. Supp. at 1144, Judge Russell Smith concluded that when the
legislature creates a remedy, that remedy is exclusive.
94. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-503 (1985).
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gaged in discriminatory practices."9 5
3. Administrative Hearing
After the complaint has been filed, the commission staff at-
tempts to settle the case informally.9 6 If this proves impossible,
there will be a contested case hearing to determine the merits of
the case.9 7 Following this hearing, the Commission will either issue
an order requiring that the discriminatory practice be ceased9" or
dismiss the complaint.9 9 The Commission or a party may also seek
an injunction from a district court should the order go
unheeded. 100
The importance of the administrative hearing should not be
overlooked, even though the results are appealable to district
court.10 1 When reviewing a decision of the Human Rights Commis-
sion, a district court cannot redetermine the credibility of wit-
nesses and the weight given evidence by the Commission. The
court may only determine whether substantial evidence existed to
support the Commission's decision.1
02
E. Remedies
The statutory remedies 03 provided on a fair housing claim in-
95. Id.
96. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-504 (1985).
97. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-505 (1985).
98. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-506 (1985).
99. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-507 (1985).
100. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-508 (1985).
101. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-4-702 (1985) and MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 4(2).
102. Martinez v. Yellowstone Cnty. Welfare Dep't, - Mont ,.. 626 P.2d
242, 247 (1981).
103. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-506 (1985) provides:
Procedure upon a finding of discrimination. (1) If the commission finds that a
person, institution, entity, or agency against whom a complaint was filed has en-
gaged in the discriminatory practice alleged in the complaint, the commission
shall order him or it to refrain from engaging in the discriminatory conduct. The
order may:
(a) prescribe conditions on the accused's future conduct relevant to the type
of discriminatory practice found;
(b) require any reasonable measure to correct the discriminatory practice and
to rectify any harm, pecuniary or otherwise, to the person discriminated against;
(c) require a report on the manner of compliance.
(2) The order may not require payment of any punitive damages.
(3) Whenever a commission order or conciliation agreement requires inspec-
tion by the commission staff for a period of time to determine if the respondent is
complying with that order or agreement, the period of time may not be more than
3 years.
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clude (1) injunctive relief,104 (2) compensatory damages, 1 5 and (3)
attorney fees.10 6 Punitive damages are expressly prohibited. 10 7
1. Injunctive Relief
The most important remedies for a claimant in a fair housing
action are to obtain the housing and end the discriminatory prac-
tice. The Human Rights Commission may order such relief.10 8 If a
litigant appeals the matter to a district court, that court may pro-
vide the same remedies.10 9 This relief may include an order prohib-
iting future discrimination' 10 and may require future inspection by
the Commission staff."1 If the landlord fails to comply with an or-
der of the Human Rights Commission, the Commission staff or a
party may move the district court for an appropriate order. 112
2. Compensatory Damages
Montana statute provides that the remedies for a housing dis-
crimination claim may include measures to correct any harm to the
claimant." 3 This may include monetary damages," 4 but punitive
damages are expressly prohibited. 165
3. Attorney Fees
Montana law allows attorney fees to the prevailing party."16 In
the case of actions before the Human Rights Commission, the pre-
vailing party may petition the district court for attorney fees."17 If
the case goes to district court, that court may award attorney
fees. ' 8 In both cases, attorney fees are at the discretion of the dis-
trict court. A losing tenant may therefore avoid paying the land-
lord's legal fees if the court finds such avoidance to be equitable.
104. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-506(1)(a) (1985).
105. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-506(1)(b) (1985).
106. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-505(4) (1985). See also, MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-509(3)
(1985).
107. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-506(2) (1985).
108. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-506(1) (1985).
109. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-509(3) (1985).
110. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-506(1)(a) (1985).
111. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-506(3) (1985).
112. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-508 (1985).
113. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-506(1)(b) (1985).
114. Id.
115. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-506(2) (1985).
116. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-505(4) (1985).
117. Id.
118. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-509(3) (1985).
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F. Criminal Penalties
Violation of the Montana Human Rights Act carries criminal
as well as civil liability. Montana statute provides a penalty of a
$500 fine or 6 months imprisonment, or both, for violation of the
Act or for resisting an order of the Human Rights Commission.' 1'
This suggests not only an additional inducement for a landlord to
cease the discrimination, but also an additional way for an indigent
plaintiff to seek redress. Rather than filing a civil action, the per-
son denied housing due to discrimination may file a criminal com-
plaint with the county attorney. In addition, the Human Rights
Commission may file a criminal complaint if a case of housing dis-
crimination comes to its attention.1
20
It should be remembered that violations of the act include not
only the actual discrimination, but also advertising a discrimina-
tory intent1 2 ' and inquiring into whether a tenant belongs to any of
the categories against which discrimination is prohibited.122
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
The 1987 Montana Legislature should clarify its stance re-
garding the issue of age discrimination in housing. This matter in-
volves the competing interests of several different sectors of soci-
ety. The needs of landlords, families, single parents, senior citizens,
and childless adults should be balanced to arrive at a sound public
policy. By delaying until 1987 the imposition of its rule interpret-
ing the housing provision of the Human Rights Act, the Human
Rights Commission has invited legislative determination of age dis-
crimination issues.
A. The Interests to be Considered
The Legislature should balance the interests of four distinct
segments of society relating to child-exclusionary housing. First,
the legislature should consider the needs of families with children,
including single parent families, to attain suitable housing. Chil-
dren should not be excluded from large portions of the housing
market. They should not be relegated to the worst neighborhoods
with the worst educational opportunities. Our culture should focus
on the nurturing of children and promote the hope that they might
grow up in the best environment possible.
119. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-601 (1985).
120. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-501 (1985).
121. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-305(3) (1985).
122. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-305(1)(c) (1985).
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Second, the interests of landlords in determining the use of
their own property should be considered. The Legislature should
consider whether the law should allow a landlord to exclude large
portions of the population from housing based on assumptions
about an entire class.
Third, the Legislature should consider the needs of senior citi-
zens. Many older citizens require special housing accommodations.
An exception to any ban on age-restrictive housing should be made
for their benefit.
Finally, the Legislature should evaluate the needs of childless
adults who may desire a child-free environment. On this question,
the words of the court in Schmidt v. Superior Court 2 3 are particu-
larly appropriate. The Schmidt court pointed out that, absent the
special needs of senior citizens, "the right of an adult to enjoy such
relative tranquility is decidedly outweighed by society's vital and
compelling interest in providing housing which fosters wholesome
development of its children." 2"
A thoughtful weighing of these competing interests will un-
doubtedly show the balance to tilt heavily in favor of the children.
This determination should not be seen as another attempt of gov-
ernment to interfere with and regulate the lives of citizens. Rather,
it should be viewed as an effort to protect the family and to pro-
mote the proper nurturing of the next generation.
B. Restrictive Covenants
If Montana adopts a clear prohibition of child-restrictive lease
provisons, the current language of the Montana Human Rights Act
should be read as invalidating age-restrictive covenants as well.
The act currently prohibits discrimination "relating to the use,
sale, lease, or rental of the housing accommodation or property."12 5
Logic requires that if a property owner may not use a lease
provision to prohibit occupancy by children, the same goal should
not be accomplished by a restrictive covenant. Both methods are
simply unilateral discriminatory actions.
C. Montana and "Mrs. Murphy"
The housing provision of the Montana Human Rights Act"'
123. - Cal. App. 3d __, 215 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1985).
124. Id. at -, 215 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
125. MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-305(1)(b) (1985).
126. Mont. Code Ann. § 49-2-305 (1985). While the Act does allow an exemption for "a
private residence designed for single-family occupancy in which sleeping space is rented to
guests and in which the landlord also resides," MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-305(2) (1985), this
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does not currently contain "Mrs. Murphy's exemption," as found
in the federal act. 127 This exemption accommodates the individual
who rents apartments or rooms in his own home. The exemption
excludes qualifying units from the provisions of the federal Fair
Housing Act.128 It allows the individual the freedom to open one's
home to whomever the individual may desire without having to
justify his motives to the government. This is already federal
law.129
VII. CONCLUSION
Courts and legislatures across the United States increasingly
prohibit the exclusion of families with children from housing de-
velopments. The Montana Human Rights Commission has recently
adopted an administrative rule following this trend. Montana
should continue this course, while protecting the interests of senior
citizens. As one observer notes, "If you don't see kids, something
dies inside of you, and if you don't like them, something's already
died inside of you."1 30
differs from the federal act, which allows the exemption for permanent renters rather than
merely guests. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (1982).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (1982) provides an exemption from the federal Fair Hous-
ing Act for: "rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or intended to
be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other, if the owner
actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his residence."
128. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (1982).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (1982).
130. California State Senator Peter Behr, quoted in Groller, Keep Kids Out, Parents,
Aug. 1978, at 66.
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